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Insider Trading, Investment, And Liquidity: A Welfare Analysis
SUDIPTO  BHATTACHARYA and GIOVANNA  NICODANO*
ABSTRACT
We compare equilibrium trading outcomes with and without participation by an informed insider, assuming
inflexible ex ante aggregate investment choices by agents. Noise trading arises from aggregate uncertainty
regarding other agents' intertemporal consumption preferences. The welfare levels of outsiders can thus be
ascertained. The allocations without insider trading are not ex ante Pareto-efficient, since our model differs
from standard ones with negative exponential utility functions and normal returns. We characterize the
circumstances under which the revelation of payoff-relevant information via prices -- arising from insider
trading -- benefits outsiders with stochastic liquidity needs, by improving  risk-sharing among them.
 In models of informed trading (Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), Allen (1984), Dennert
(1992), Leland (1992), Repullo (1994)) it has been customary -- in order not to have an
unrealistic fully revealing Rational Expectation Equilibrium (REE) and no profits for informed
traders -- to postulate some portion of the market demand for securities as arising from
unmodeled "noise traders", whose endowments and preferences for consumption are left
unspecified.  This makes it difficult to reach a welfare judgement regarding the impact of
insider trading, even when the implications for the informativeness of asset prices and
investment can be ascertained. Thus, an important issue in financial regulatory policy regarding
the desirability of allowing trading by asymmetrically informed corporate insiders remains
largely unresolved at the conceptual level.
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Our major goal in this paper is to rectify this shortcoming by modeling both noise
traders and rational (a priori) uninformed traders together, as agents with well-specified
preferences. These agents allocate their endowments across a risky long-term and a riskless
short-term investment ex ante, when their intertemporal consumption preferences are uncertain.
A shock to their preferences1 is then realized, inducing a subset of them (the “early-diers”) to
consume by selling their risky assets in the interim asset market, before the payoff to their long-
term investment is realized. The aggregate proportion of agents wishing to consume early is
also uncertain ex ante. Thus, our methodology "transplants" modeling techniques from the
literature on banking  (Bryant (1980), Diamond and Dybvig (1983)) to the arena of insider
trading, as pioneered by Qi (1996).
Our second methodological contribution is to note that, with privately observed and
not-separately-insured shocks to agents’ preferences, markets are incomplete as in Hart (1975).
Thus, interim traded outcomes with ex ante investment choices, made in a one-commodity (at
each time-point) model, would in general be Pareto-inferior to what could be attained by a
planner, even if she had no information on agents’ realized liquidity shocks; see Bhattacharya
and Gale (1987). Hence, to examine the incremental impact of insider trading on other agents'
welfare, we consider a scenario in which interim traded outcomes are ex ante Pareto
inefficient even without the insider, and then characterize the impact of her trading on the other
agents’ expected utilities. Our framework differs from the negative exponential utility functions
and normal returns modeling of Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), Leland (1992), and Dow and
Rahi (1996), who work with settings in which the interim traded outcomes are ex-ante Pareto
efficient for the agents they model, in the absence of private information about asset returns.2
Recent work on insider trading (Leland (1992), Repullo (1994), as well as some
related work by Allen (1984)), emphasizes that the greater interim informativeness of asset
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prices brought about by informed trading may benefit other investors' welfare, if aggregate
investment choices are sufficiently flexible at the interim stage. Thus, for example, the average
level of risky interim investment is higher with than without insider trading in Leland (1992).
This is due to the lower conditional variance of future asset returns in a noisy REE with insider
trading, which leads rational outsiders to augment their demand schedules for the risky
investment.3 Diamond and Verrecchia (1982) and recently Holmstrom and Tirole (1993) have
pointed out that interim share prices which reflect a greater degree of otherwise unverifiable
payoff-relevant information may also be useful to construct more precise performance
measures for motivating effort by risk-averse managers. In this paper, we deemphasize these
interim productive effects, and assume instead inflexible ex ante aggregate investment
portfolio choices by the firm's investors. Our choice is justified in environments in which the
time lag between the accrual of insider information and subsequent public knowledge thereof,
for example for accounting earnings or tender offers, is short and/or the nature of such interim
information allows its costless and verifiable disclosure ex post. At a more basic level, we
wish to argue that future-payoff-relevant insider information that might be useful for the interim
collective choices of a firm need not be reflected in its interim share price via insider trading
in order to impact on the firm's choices. Insiders who receive such information would use it in
making appropriate choices for the firm, as long as they are otherwise suitably rewarded via ex
post bonuses etc. to reflect the firm’s owners’ welfare. Hence, any analysis of the impact of
insider trading on the welfare of the outside shareholders of a firm should not assign a
prominent role to its effect on the firm's  interim choices. 
In our model interim asset prices are influenced by the stochastic proportion of
outsiders who sell and can be further modified by the presence of insider trading. The interim
consumption and portfolio allocations of non-insiders are clearly affected by a greater
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informativeness of asset prices brought about by informed insider trading. The insider, in turn,
is a strategic player and takes the others agents’ selling and optimal portfolio choices into
account in deciding on her trading strategy, given her private information regarding future asset
returns at the interim stage. We study the resulting equilibrium impact of insider trading on the
information contained in the long-term asset price regarding its future return, and on the
outsiders’ ex ante expected utilities. In the process we characterize the ex ante investment
choices and the interim  and ex post consumption levels of the early- and late-dier outsiders.
We compare agents’ optimal choices, given aggregate resource constraints and/or
budget constraints at equilibrium prices, as well as their welfare levels across three scenarios:
(A) choices by a welfare-maximising planner; (B) interim trading among outsider agents only;
and (C) interim trading with possible participation by the insider. These comparisons are
carried out numerically, for reasons of tractability in the face of possibly binding interim
liquidity constraints or “corner solutions”, which in turn affect the agents’ ex ante optimal
choices. We find that outsiders’ welfare is always the highest in scenario (A), which is not
surprising since our planner is endowed with more interim information than the insider. She can
thus adjust early- and late-dying agents’ consumption levels to the information on the return on
the long-term asset as well as on the realized aggregate liquidity shock. Such responsiveness of
allocations is in general beneficial for outsiders’ welfare. Our comparisons across the two
trading scenarios generate subtler and perhaps surprising conclusions.                   Often the
outsiders’ expected utility levels are higher in scenario (C), in which the insider may take part
in the interim asset trading, as compared to scenario (B) in which outsiders carry out such
trading among themselves. This outcome is more likely to arise when their adverse selection
losses to the insider are lower, which happens for example when the lowest possible return on
the risky technology rises, or when the variability in the aggregate liquidity demand of outsiders
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diminishes. This net beneficial impact of insider trading on outsiders is more likely to arise
when the average proportion of agents requiring early consumption increases – provided it is
not so large as to make trading by the insider unprofitable for her.4
The main beneficial impact of insider trading for outsiders, which compensates for the
adverse selection losses incurred by them in trading, arises as follows. Since the insider does
not sell5 the long-term asset when its anticipated return is high, and if in addition the aggregate
liquidity shock is low, the market price of the long-term asset fully reflects its high return. This
enhances the consumption level of early-diers, subject to the liquid endowments of late-dier
agents. This impact of insider trading on the outsider agents’ consumption profiles is the
dominant factor behind the possibility of outsiders’ welfare improving with insider trading.6 It
arises without any interim flexibility in aggregate real investment choices, unlike in the models
of Allen (1984), Leland (1992), and Dow and Rahi (1996). However, outside investors are
less likely to be better off with insider trading when the range of variation in the proportion of
early-dying agents in the economy is greater, because the insider is thereby able to sell higher
quantities of the long-term asset when its anticipated future return is low.7 As a result the
adverse selection losses arising from her sales to the late-dier outsiders, at a price that is not
fully revealing of her information, increase.
Insider trading might also reduce outsiders’ ex ante under- or over- investment in the
long-term asset relative to its first-best level. This possibility is logically present in an
incomplete-markets setting with agents subject to uninsured private liquidity shocks, in which
interim traded allocations are generically ex ante inefficient (Bhattacharya and Gale (1987)).
However, this effect does not appear to arise uniformly in our numerical simulations.                
         Our paper is set out as follows. In Section I, we describe the main features of our model,
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and the solution methods for it. Numerical comparisons of investment choices, asset prices and
agents' welfare levels are carried out in Section II. In Section III we conclude.
I. ALTERNATIVE ALLOCATIONAL MECHANISMS
There are three time points t=0,1,2.  All agents are born at t=0 and supply inelastically
endowments of unity in aggregate. There is a continuum of agents with an aggregate Lebesgue
measure of unity, and in addition, possibly an Insider with a strictly positive measure.
Endowments can be invested either in a risky technology paying off at t=2, or in a riskless
storage technology paying off at t=1 and, if reinvested at t=1, at t=2.  Holdings of the two-
period risky technology can, however, be traded in a secondary market at t=1, with selling by
agents who wish to consume early.  The storage technology has unit gross returns and the risky
technology with constant returns to scale has final payoffs per unit investment of ~q  distributed
as:                                         qL  with probability (1-p)
                                                    ~q  =                           (1)
                                           qH  with probability (1-p)
as viewed from the ex ante time point t=0, where qH>1> qL.  It is assumed that p is common
knowledge among all the agents and so is the expected return on the risky asset:
                                                    pqL  +  (1-p)qH  > 1. (2)
For convenience, we sometimes denote {p,(1-p)} as {pL, pH}.   
The outside agents' intertemporal preferences for consumption, at t=1or at t=2, can be
described as follows.  There are two aggregate liquidity states l and h, and associated
conditional probabilities 0<al <ah <1, such that conditional on the aggregate state l(h), each 
agent's utility function for consumption at times t=1 and t=2 is an independently identically
distributed random variable:
            U (C1) with probability   {[al ], or [ah]}, or
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                      U(C1,C2)  =                                                                                                      (3)
         U (C2) with probability    {[1-al ], or [1-ah ]}
These aggregate liquidity states, l and h, are assumed to arise with ex ante probabilities q and
(1-q), sometimes denoted {ql, qh}. We assume that {q, al, ah} are common knowledge, but that
each uninformed agent only knows her own realized U(C1,C2), but not the aggregate state l(h). 
These ex ante random interim preferences, coupled with their aggregate variability, have
effects on interim asset prices similar to those arising from "noise traders" in REE models. 8
Agents make per capita real investment choices across the two technologies, the short-
and the long-term, in proportions K and (1-K) respectively at t=0. Further net investment in, or
liquidation of, the risky technology at the interim date t=1 is assumed to be infeasible.
However, individual agents who wish to consume at t=1, and those who wish to postpone their
consumption until t=2, can anticipate trading their long-term investment in the risky technology
at equilibrium prices P(K, qj, ai), jÎ {L,H}, iÎ {l,h}, per unit investment. Here, P(K, qj, ai) is
the Rational Expectation Equilibrium price mapping from the underlying aggregate state, which
includes the equilibrium investment choice K at t=0. This mapping must be measurable with
respect to the information possessed by the collection of trading agents, possibly including the
insider when she participates. The insider is assumed to have an exogenous endowment of the
risky technology, from which she may choose to sell an amount and reinvest the proceeds in the
short-term technology at the interim (t=1) date.
A. Ex Ante Optimal Allocations 
   The central planner, endowed with interim information about the future risky asset payoff and
the aggregate liquidity state, would choose Ct,ij and  K to maximize:
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                                          [ ]    q  U(C ) +  (1- )U(C )
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p a a                            (4)
subject to the resource constraints that, for each aggregate state  (i,j) Î{l,h}´{L,H}:
                                                                        ai C1,ij £ K                                                       
(5a)
                                                (1-ai) C2,ij = [qj (1-K) +K- ai C1,ij]                                     (5b)
where the subscripts (i,j) refer to the states of liquidity, l (h), and of risky asset return, L (H).
B. Traded Equilibria Without Inside Information
           The consumption levels of early- and late- diers are, respectively:
                                                             [ ]1ij ijC   =   (1- K)P + K                                              (6a)
[ ]))(PX+K-(1  +  ))(PXP-(K  =  C ijijjijijij2ij q              (6b)
where Xij(Pij) is the net amount of the long-term asset bought per unit of  late-diers, at t=1. In an
equilibrium without the insider trading, {Pij, Xij} can only depend on the liquidity state i. 
Furthermore, we must have market clearing:
                                                (1-ai )X (Pi ) = ai (1-K)                                                  (7a)
and since the late-diers wishing to consume only at t=2 have, in the aggregate, no agents to
borrow from9, we must also have:  
                                          K-Pi X (Pi ) ³ 0.                                            (7b)  
Equations (7a) and (7b) together imply the aggregate liquidity constraint on market-clearing
prices:                                              
                                                       Pi ai (1-K)  £ (1-a i ) K.                                                 (8)
 In their ex ante choice of K, the representative agents maximize their ex ante expected utility:
[ ])C)U(-(1 + )CU( q    2iji1iiji
HL,=jhli}X{K,
Max
i
aapåå
= .
(9)
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whereas at t=1, given Pi (which in equilibrium will only reveal state l or h to traders without
private information about ~q ), the "late diers" choose Xi for I = {l, h}, in order to:
                                                           ]|)([ 2
}{
iijj
HL,=jX
PCU   Max
i
på                                                       (10)
leading to a uniquely maximal Xi(Pi) which, in the interim equilibrium represented by equation
(7a) must also satisfy equation (7b), given the ex ante optimal choice of K that anticipates the
equilibrium evolution of {Xi, Pi} at time t=1.
      Using the first-order conditions for the maximization problem in equations (10) and
equation (7a), we determine candidate interim equilibrium prices Pi(K) for a given K. These
are found from among the positive real roots of a non-linear equation in Pi
10, unless the no-
borrowing constraint (7b) binds, in which case the market price is derived from equality in
equation (8). We then calculate the implied ex ante  choice of K using the maximization
program in equation (9) taking the interim prices and trades as being given by the earlier set of
calculations, and iterate until convergence in K.
 C. Noisy REE with Insider Trading and Market Orders
       We now postulate that, in addition to the agents we have already modeled, there is an
insider endowed at t=0 with n³[ah -al] units of the long-term technology only, which she may
sell at time t=1 and invest in the riskless technology. This insider only wishes to consume at
time t=2, and she knows perfectly at t=1 the return qj on the long-term asset. Solely for
simplicity in computing her expected utility, which determines her decision to participate in the
interim trading at t=1 or not, we assume that the insider is risk-neutral.
The outside late-diers’ trades are now allowed to depend on the partitions of the
aggregate state space, {al,ah}´{qL,qH}, that are revealed to them by the equilibrium prices
with the insider trading. The outside agents take the market-clearing REE prices in these
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partitions as given parametrically, and the late-diers submit demand functions {X(P)} with
domain restricted to these prices only; the early-diers supply their long-lived assets
inelastically. The insider chooses her trading rule strategically to take these outsiders’
behavior into account. We assume that the insider can submit market orders only, so that in
effect she can condition her sales only on her realised information about q~ , but not on the
aggregate liquidity shock among non-insiders, {ai }. This assumption is consistent with the
feature of our model that early-dier outsiders supply their long-term assets inelastically, and
hence the insider can mimic their sales only via (many small) market orders.  Since it is in the
interest of the insider to “mask” her private information about q~ , strategic trading by the
insider will result in a noisy REE in which the following three partitions of the aggregate state
space are revealed by equilibrium prices:
                                                            (h,L)                                                                      (11a)
      
    {(l,L)  È  (h,H)} (11b)
                                                            (l,H)                                                                      (11c)
with the associated (weakly increasing) set of interim prices {Pa,Pb,Pc} respectively. In such
an equilibrium, the insider sells a quantity Q>0 of the risky asset in states {h,L} and {l,L}, and
does not trade otherwise. In particular, we rule out any borrowing at t=1 by the insider from
late-dier outsiders to buy the long-lived asset. Even if the insider were to possess some
endowment of the short-term asset, it is easy to show that she could not profitably carry out
both buying and selling at t=1, without revealing one of these trades through its impact on the
market-clearing interim asset price. Hence, for simplicity, we focus on insider sales only. The
insider’s choice of Q is made subject to the knowledge that late-dier outsiders would now
choose their net purchases per capita (per unit measure) of the risky asset Xij, in aggregate state
{i,j}, to maximize their conditional expected utility:
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where Pij is the noisy REE equilibrium price at t=1 in state {i,j} per unit of the risky
technology, ijpˆ  is the outsiders’ revised beliefs about q
~
, and Xij must satisfy:
Xij = Xkl , i ¹k and/or j¹l, if Pij = Pkl. (12b)
The outsiders’ trades at t=1 must also satisfy a no-borrowing constraint:
                                                 Pij Xij £ K,  "ij.                                                               (12c)  
Equivalently, taking market clearing into account, the REE prices must meet the aggregate
liquidity constraint (where Qj  equals Q for j=L, and 0 otherwise):
                                        Pij  [ai (1-K) + Qj] £ (1-ai ) K.                                                   (13)
The revised beliefs }ˆ{ ijp  of outsiders depend, of course, on the partitions of the aggregate state
space generated by the trading of themselves and the insider. Finally, the outsiders’ ex ante
investment is computed to maximize in equation (9), taking into account the {Xij,Pij}
configurations that would arise from such an ex ante K choice. Finally, in examining the
existence of an equilibrium with Q>0 trades by the insider, we must compare her expected
utility in such an equilibrium versus one in which -- as in Section I.B above – she desists from
trading, and thus one obtains an equilibrium in which prices are P1 in states [{l,L} and {l,H}],
and Ph£Pl in states[{h,L} and {h,H}]. We are now in a position to describe fully the noisy REE
arising with the informed insider trading.
PROPOSITION. If condition (16) below is satisfied, then there exists a noisy REE in which
the insider sells Q>0 in states {l,L} and {h,L} where Q satisfies:
         (1-K)ah = (1-ah)X(Pb) (14a)
(1-K)al + Q  = (1-al)X(Pb) (14b)
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where X(Pb) is the late-diers’ per capita demand for trade in the risky technology in states
[{l,L}and {h,H}] given equilibrium price Pb therein, chosen to maximize in equation (12a)
given their revised beliefs:
( ) ( )LlHh
Hh
bH qq
q
Pˆ
p+p
p
=p (14c)
with the complementary conditional probability HL ˆ1ˆ p-=p . In the other states, equilibrium
prices and beliefs satisfy:
                                             (1-ah) X (Pa) = (1-K)ah + Q               (14d)
in state {h,L} with ( )aH Ppˆ =0, where X(Pa) maximizes in equation (12a) given Pa and
( )aL/H Ppˆ ; and
  (1-al) X(Pc) = (1-K)al (14e)
in state {l,H}  with ( )cH Ppˆ  = 1, where X(Pc) maximizes in equation (12a) given Pc
and ( )CL/H Ppˆ .  Interim net trade demands of the late-dier outsiders clearly must satisfy the
conditions:
                                              X(Pa) =       K/Pa                    if Pa <qL                                                   (15a)
                                                         Î      [0, (K/P a)]       otherwise                                (15b)  
  
and, similarly,
                                             X(Pc) =     K/Pc                     if Pc <qH                                                       (15c)
                                                        Î    [0, (K/Pc)]         otherwise.                                 (15d)  
 
Together, the outsiders’ investment choice K and the interim equilibrium prices must satisfy the
aggregate liquidity constraint (13). Finally, in order to satisfy the condition for profitability of
this insider trading strategy we must have that, in equilibrium, given the ex ante optimal choice
of K by non-insiders:
ql(Pb-qL) + qh(Pa-qL) ³  0. (16)
Remark 1: Violation of inequality (16) is possible since Pa<qL is feasible.
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Remark 2: For simplicity, our insider is endowed only with the risky asset and can only sell it
because any interim borrowing reveals her identity. If she also had some of the riskless asset,
she would not buy the risky asset in state H and then sell it in state L via market orders, since
then the equilibrium would be fully revealing and her profits would be driven to zero.
Remark 3: As noted above, the insider would not send limit (i.e., price-contingent) orders that
 reveal her identity, given that the early-dier outsiders submit market orders.
       The insider sells the risky asset when the risky asset payoff is low and does not trade
otherwise. Since she masks her trades, the quantity sold by her depends on the range of
variation in the proportion of early-dying agents, in such a way that late-diers do not know
whether they are buying from early-diers or from the insider. However she cannot condition
her orders on prices. It follows that the state {l,H} is revealed because the proportion of early-
diers is low and the insider has no incentive to sell. Similarly, the state {h,L} is revealed by
the sales coming from the insider and also a high proportion of outsiders with liquidity needs.
II. NUMERICAL RESULTS ON INVESTMENTS, PRICES, AND WELFARE
The possibility of “corner solutions” vis-à-vis interim {Xij} trades appears to rule out a
fully analytic solution for computing equilibria. Hence, even for our agents with additively
separable power utilities, we have to resort to numerical calibrations11 in order to compare
equilibrium outcomes across alternative informational regimes. We seek to understand under
what circumstances one would expect to see one trading regime to do better than another for the
other agents' ex ante welfare levels. Such understanding is of importance in order to establish
guidelines for desirable regulatory restrictions on insider trading which is ex-post detectable
and adequately punishable.
We have computed equilibrium allocations for the grid of parameter values below:
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(i)  {q,p} = {½ , ½};
(ii) {al, ah}  = {0.1, 0.15} , {0.9, 0.95},{0.48, 0.53}, {0.45, 0.55} , {0.4, 0.6};  and
(iii) {qL}Î{0.75, 0.8, 0.85, 0.9, 0.95},  with {qH}Î{1.25, 1.3, 1.35, 1.4, 1.45, 1.5}.
        For most of our simulations, we have worked with U(C)=-C-2, with a relative risk
aversion coefficient of three, though other U(C) were tried as well. We have taken n=1, i.e., an
insider with at least equal shareholdings as that of non-insiders. However, it is only the
equilibrium extent of selling of the risky technology in some states of nature at t=1 by the
insider (Q>0) that has an impact on interim prices. Such trading is bounded above by the
difference in the aggregate selling of the long-term asset by the early-dier outsiders across the
states {l,L} and {h,H}, a difference which the insider “masks” via her trading.
From the comparisons in Table I, we see that: (1) the first-best solution (A) always
dominates the uninformed only trading (B) and insider trading (C) scenarios in ex ante welfare,
(2) that for {ah - al} =0.05, the outsiders’ welfare is higher with insider trading (C) than
without in 26 of the 30 cells of the matrix in the {qL,qH} space12, and (3) this outcome arises
only in 10 cells when {ah -al} =0.1 and in only four cells if  {ah -al} =0.2. Note also that
insider trading is more likely to improve outsiders’ welfare when  qL is high, and the extent  to
which it does so is greater when qH  goes up. However, as the gap {ah -al}  widens allowing
the amount of insider selling Q to increase, equilibria with insider trading  tend to become
worse for outsiders than equilibria without such trading, owing to the adverse selection losses
of the late-diers to the insider in the state {l,L}.
In Panel 1 of Table II, we look at outsiders’ ex ante investment (K) choices across
scenarios (A), (B), and (C), focusing on the case  {al, ah}={0.48, 0.53}. No clear pattern of
comparison emerges, except to note that K(B)>K(C)>K(A) when {qL,qH} are low, whereas
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K(A)>K(B)>K(C) or K(A)>K(C)>K(B) when {qL,qH} are high. Hence, there appears to be no
universal pattern of investment choice with insider trading,  K(C), being closer to the first-best
 choice K(A) than  is K(B), the agents'  choice in the equilibrium without the insider. In Panel 2
of Table II, we look at interim prices -- in the two partitions {al, ah} for trading scenario (B)
and in the three partitions {[(al ,qH], [al ,qL) È (al ,qH)], [ah ,q L]} for scenario (C) -- for
different values of {qL,qH}. Note that in the partition [al ,qH] the equilibrium with insider
trading often has the interim long-term asset price equaling qH, which leads to consumption
gains for early diers, that are beneficial for of the ex ante welfare of outsider agents. The
interim traded outcome without the insider is ex ante inefficient in this respect.
We have also computed some welfare comparisons for lower and higher average level
of a. For {al, ah} = {0.1, 0.15}, the insider trading solution (C) is welfare superior to the
solution (B) only when qL³0.9, as compared to qL³0.8 when {al, ah} = {0.48, 0.53}.
However, the insider chooses not to trade when qL=0.95 and qH³1.4, so that insider trading
effectively aids outsiders’ welfare in only nine of the 30 cells. The reasons for these patterns
are that (i) with lower a, fewer early-diers gain from the price improvement in the {al, qH}
state brought about by insider trading, and (ii) with high  {qL ,qH} the insider’s losses in the
state {ah, qL} overwhelm her gains in {al ,qL}. With  {al, ah} = {0.9, 0.95}, the insider
chooses not to trade whenever qL³0.09 and qH³1.35, or qL=0.95, so that the trading scenario
(C) improves outsiders’ welfare as compared to scenario (B)   in only five of the 30 {qL ,qH} 
cells.13
III. CONCLUDING REMARKS
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We have shown, with an intertemporal model of individual as well as aggregate
liquidity shocks to uninformed agents, that insider trading can improve outsiders’ welfare, even
when aggregate investment choices can not respond to any partial revelation of information
brought about by such insider trading via prices. The rationale behind our finding is the
beneficial impact of insider trading on outsiders’ selling prices and consumption in some
states, which more than compensates for their adverse selection losses in other states of nature.
When short-term traders sell their shares, informationally-efficient share prices lead to larger
transfers from long-term traders to short-term traders when the future returns are high, and
smaller transfers from long-term traders to short-term traders when the future returns are low.
As a result, insider trading improves risk-sharing among the outsiders, which can compensate
for their adverse selection losses to her. We find these results to be interesting, because the
impact of insider trading via prices on interim investment choices by a firm -- an “alternative
channel” for its beneficial effect -- is artificial at best, when the same insiders  choose the
firm’s investment policy.
 A net beneficial impact of insider trading on outsiders’ welfare, which we have
documented, is particularly likely to arise when (1) the insider’s equilibrium trades are small,
relative to outsiders’ liquidity-based trades, and (2) the riskiness (lower bound) of returns on
the risky investment, about which the insider is privately informed at the interim date, is not too
high (low). Otherwise, as is conventionally thought, insider trading is harmful to the outsiders’
welfare, owing to the adverse selection losses to them arising from her trades.
                                                                           
17
REFERENCES
Allen, Franklin, 1984, A welfare analysis of rational expectations equilibria in markets,
Manuscript, Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania.                                     
Bhattacharya, Sudipto, and Douglas Gale, 1987, Preference shocks, liquidity and central bank
policy, in William A. Barnett and Ken J. Singleton eds.: New Approaches to Monetary
Economics,  (Cambridge University Press, New York, NY).
Bryant, John, 1980, A model of reserves, bank runs, and deposit insurance, Journal of Banking
and Finance  4,  335-344.
Dennert, Jurgen, 1992, Insider trading and the cost of capital in a multi-period economy,
Discussion Paper no.128, LSE Financial Markets Group.
Diamond, Douglas W., and Philip H. Dybvig, 1983, Bank runs, deposit insurance, and
liquidity, Journal of Political Economy  91, 401-419.
Diamond, Douglas W., and Robert E. Verrecchia, 1981, Information aggregation in a noisy
rational expectations economy, Journal of Financial Economics 9, 221-235.
Diamond, Douglas W., and Robert E. Verrecchia, 1982, Optimal managerial contracts and
equilibrium security prices, The Journal of Finance  37, 275-287.
Dow, James, and Rohit Rahi, 1999, Informed trading, investment, and welfare, The Journal of
Business, forthcoming.
Grossman, Sanford, and Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1980, On the impossibility of informationally
efficient markets, American Economic Review  70, 393-406.
Hart, Oliver D., 1975, On the optimality of equilibrium when the market structure is
incomplete, The Journal of Economic Theory  11,  418-443.
                                                                           
18
Holmström, Bengt, and Jean Tirole, 1993, Market liquidity and performance monitoring,
Journal of Political Economy 101,  678-709.
Leland, Haine, 1992,  Insider trading: Should it be prohibited?, Journal of Political Economy
100, 859-887.
Kyle, Albert S., 1985, Continuous auctions and insider trading, Econometrica 53, 1315-35.
Qi, Jianping, 1996, Efficient investment and financial intermediation, Journal of Banking and
Finance 20 , 891-900.
Repullo, Rafael, 1994, Some remarks on Leland’s model of insider trading, Working paper,
CEMFI (Madrid).
                                                                           
19
Table I
Ex Ante Optimal Expected Utilities of Outside Agents
This table shows the ex ante optimal expected utilities of outside agents.  Section (A) reports values for the first best, while sections (B) and (C) portray the no-insider and the
insider trading cases respectively.  The  qj  are the realized payoffs to the risky technology.  The ai  are the realized shares of early-diers among the outsiders. The range of
variation for ai  increases from Panel 1 (0.05) to Panel 3 (0.2). Cells have a dark frame when outsiders’ welfare is higher with than without insider trading. Values are marked
with * when the liquidity constraint is imposed in state lH, and with ^ when the liquidity constraint is imposed in states lH, lL and hH. In the shaded areas it does not pay the
insider to trade and equilibrium values coincide with those in  (B).
(A)First Best                                                                    (B)Without Insider Trading                                           (C)With Insider
Submitting  Market Orders
qH / qL 0.75 0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95 0.75 0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95 0.75 0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95
Panel 1: al = 0.48, ah = 0.53
1.25 -0.5 -0.497939 -0.489502 -0.477079 -0.46507 -0.5 -0.498982 -0.494808 -0.484431 -0.470024 -0.499945 -0.499217 -0.494371 -0.48182^ -0.46739^
1.3 -0.498621 -0.493293 -0.482096 -0.469815 -0.45792 -0.499319 -0.496688 -0.490697 -0.478592 -0.464251 -0.499554 -0.496632 -0.489255 -0.47523^ -0.46094^
1.35 -0.495351 -0.487462 -0.475247 -0.463101 -0.451316 -0.497705 -0.493809 -0.486493 -0.473364 -0.459077 -0.497814 -0.493145 -0.483884 -0.46933^ -0.45517^
1.4 -0.491052 -0.481171 -0.468892 -0.456876 -0.445198 -0.495582 -0.490697 -0.482415 -0.468667 -0.454418 -0.495311 -0.489255 -0.478584 -0.46403^ -0.44999^
1.45 -0.486223 -0.475106 -0.462978 -0.451089 -0.439513 -0.493197 -0.487538 -0.478552 -0.464429 -0.450206 -0.492389 -0.485228 -0.47349* -0.45926^ -0.44533^
1.5 -0.481159 -0.469443 -0.457461 -0.445693 -0.434229 -0.490697 -0.484431 -0.474934 -0.460591 -0.446384 -0.489255 -0.481213 -0.46871* -0.45494^ -0.44112^
Panel 2: al= 0.45, ah = 0.55
1.25 -0.5 -0.497939 -0.489559 -0.477782 -0.46636 -0.5 -0.49898 -0.494794 -0.484391 -0.470851 -0.499772 -0.499713 -0.495645 -0.483396 -0.4693^
1.3 -0.498621 -0.493293 -0.48241 -0.470768 -0.459455 -0.499317 -0.49668 -0.49067 -0.478643 -0.465204 -0.499931 -0.497637 -0.490946 -0.476624 -0.4624^
1.35 -0.495351 -0.487462 -0.47579 -0.464277 -0.45307 -0.497699 -0.493792 -0.486453 -0.473484 -0.460122 -0.498632 -0.494538 -0.485874 -0.470464 -0.4561^
1.4 -0.491052 -0.481248 -0.469641 -0.458252 -0.447146 -0.49557 -0.49067 -0.482359 -0.46883 -0.455527 -0.496483 -0.490946 -0.480794 -0.464829 -0.4505^
1.45 -0.486223 -0.475378 -0.463912 -0.452643 -0.441635 -0.493179 -0.487501 -0.478481 -0.464613 -0.451353 -0.493847 -0.487153 -0.475874 -0.45967^ -0.4455^
1.5 -0.481159 -0.469891 -0.458562 -0.447407 -0.436494 -0.49067 -0.484383 -0.474847 -0.46078 -0.44755 -0.490946 -0.483322 -0.471186 -0.45499^ -0.4409^
Panel 3: al = 0.4, ah = 0.6
1.25 -0.5 -0.497939 -0.489866 -0.479649 -0.469658 -0.5 -0.49901 -0.494948 -0.485 -0.473394 -0.499007 -0.500455 -0.498212 -0.487293 -0.471477
1.3 -0.498621 -0.493293 -0.483381 -0.473281 -0.463389 -0.499338 -0.496779 -0.490943 -0.479651 -0.46818 -0.500398 -0.499562 -0.494519 -0.480712 -0.465296
1.35 -0.495351 -0.487486 -0.477357 -0.46737 -0.457571 -0.497768 -0.493976 -0.48684 -0.474815 -0.463463 -0.500118 -0.497387 -0.490182 -0.474719 -0.459634
1.4 -0.491052 -0.481749 -0.471746 -0.461866 -0.452155 -0.495702 -0.490943 -0.482853 -0.47042 -0.45916 -0.498806 -0.494519 -0.485649 -0.469237 -0.454139
1.45 -0.486223 -0.476387 -0.466504 -0.456726 -0.447101 -0.49338 -0.48786 -0.479068 -0.466407 -0.455219 -0.496856 -0.491297 -0.481145 -0.464201 -0.449322
1.5 -0.481178 -0.471363 -0.461595 -0.451915 -0.442372 -0.490943 -0.484825 -0.475517 -0.462728 -0.451597 -0.494519 -0.487923 -0.47678 -0.459555 -0.444871
Table II
Ex Ante Optimal Investment Choices by Outside Agents and Asset Prices
This table reports the outsiders’ ex ante investment choices and the risky asset prices when al =0.48 and ah=0.53. Values are marked  with * when the liquidity constraint is
imposed in state lH, and with ^ when the liquidity constraint is imposed in states lH, lL and hH.
(A)First Best                                                              (B)Without Insider Trading                                                 (C)With Insider Submitting  Market Orders
qH  / qL 0.75 0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95 0.75 0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95 0.75 0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95
Panel 1: Ex Ante Investment Choices
1.25 1. 0.8341 0.5842 0.5712 0.5592 1. 0.9181 0.7857 0.5425 0.5193 1. 0.9056 0.7336 0.5265^^ 0.5205^^
1.3 0.8892 0.7264 0.5885 0.5751 0.5628 0.9453 0.8649 0.7375 0.5283 0.5177 0.9388 0.8348 0.6666 0.5270^ 0.5209^
1.35 0.8115 0.653 0.5927 0.5789 0.5662 0.9069 0.8286 0.7063 0.5273 0.5164 0.888 0.7856 0.6217 0.5275^ 0.5212^
1.4 0.755 0.6113 0.5967 0.5826 0.5696 0.879 0.8031 0.6857 0.5267 0.5156 0.8505 0.7499 0.5906 0.5279^ 0.5216^
1.45 0.713 0.6155 0.6005 0.5862 0.5728 0.8583 0.7847 0.672 0.5262 0.515 0.822 0.7235 0.5715* 0.5283^ 0.5219^
1.5 0.6811 0.6194 0.6042 0.5896 0.5783 0.8425 0.7712 0.663 0.5259 0.5146 0.8 0.7036 0.5736* 0.5287^ 0.5222^
Panel 2: Equilibrium Prices
Price Pl     (a i = 0.48)                Price Pa  (a i = 0.48 and q j = qH)
1.25 1. 1.001 1.002 1.003 1.044 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.205^ 1.176^
1.3 1.001 1.002 1.003 1.007 1.051 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.207^ 1.178^
1.35 1.002 1.003 1.004 1.011 1.057 1.35 1.35 1.35 1.209^ 1.179^
1.4 1.004 1.004 1.005 1.014 1.061 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.211^ 1.181^
1.45 1.005 1.005 1.006 1.015 1.064 1.45 1.45 1.445* 1.213^ 1.182^
1.5 1.006 1.006 1.006 1.017 1.065 1.5 1.5 1.457* 1.215^ 1.184^
 Price Ph    ( a i = 0.53)               Price Pc ( a i = 0.53 and q j = qL)
1.25 1. 0.9988 0.9976 0.997 0.9579 0.75 0.8 0.85 0.9^ 0.95^
1.3 0.9987 0.9976 0.9967 0.9933 0.9517 0.75 0.8 0.85 0.9^ 0.95^
1.35 0.9976 0.9965 0.9958 0.9894 0.9471 0.75 0.8 0.85 0.9^ 0.95^
1.4 0.9964 0.9956 0.9951 0.9867 0.9438 0.75 0.8 0.85 0.9^ 0.95^
1.45 0.9954 0.9947 0.9944 0.9849 0.9415 0.75 0.8 0.85* 0.9^ 0.95^
1.5 0.9944 0.9939 0.9939 0.9839 0.94 0.75 0.8 0.85* 0.9^ 0.95^
        Price Pb ( a i = 0.48 and q j = qL;  a i = 0.53 and q j = qL)
1.25 1.00 0.995 0.9862 0.9861^ 0.963^
1.3 0.99 0.987 0.9792 0.9881^ 0.964^
1.35 0.99 0.979 0.9731 0.99^ 0.965^
1.4 0.987 0.972 0.9679 0.9917^ 0.967^
1.45 0.97 0.966 0.9639* 0.9933^ 0.968^
1.5 0.96 0.961 0.9641* 0.9948^ 0.97^
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1 This can be interpreted as a shock to their other incomes resulting in changed preferences
over withdrawals from their savings, such as a disability shock leading to early retirement.
2 The reason is, of course, the wealth-invariant demand function for the risky asset implied by
their agents' intertemporally additively separable negative exponential utility preferences.
3 Dow and Rahi (1996) have recently extended these results to a more complete welfare
analysis, in which noise trading by outsiders is generated via shocks to their endowments - as
in Diamond and Verrecchia (1981).
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4 This occurs when a small proportion of late-diers require a very high risk premium in the
asset price to compensate for their adverse selection losses to the insider, in states in which
she sells without fully revealing her information via the long-term asset price.
5 Our insider is endowed with the risky asset, and can only sell it because any borrowing by
her to buy at the interim date would reveal her identity. In general, both buying and selling by
the insider would be inconsistent with non-revelation of her information via REE prices; see
below. 
6 Qi (1996) works with risk-neutral outsiders, hence his model does not capture the impact of
insider trading on risk-sharing among the outsider agents that our calibrations emphasise.
7 She may obtain a profitable price when the outsiders are “confused” between the two states
of nature in which (I) the aggregate liquidity shock is low and the insider is selling the long-
term asset, and (ii) the aggregate liquidity shock is high but the insider is not selling, because
she expects a high future return on the long-term asset.
8 In Bhattacharya and Gale (1987) it is shown that with agents having these interim (and
uninsured) preference
shocks as in equation (3) above, even when {a,q} are deterministic, the allocations arising
from interim trading among the agents at t=1, coupled with interim value- maximizing
investment choices at t=0, are ex ante Pareto inefficient unless U(C)=log(C).
9 The equilibrium borrowing rate at t=1 is such that no late-dier wishes to borrow.
10 The non-linear equation is quadratic with logarithmic utility and of degree 4 when U(C)=-
1/(2C2), which we use in most of our calibrations. Only one of the four roots is admissible as
an equilibrium price solution (two of the roots are complex, and a third exceeds qH.).
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11 The relevant MATHEMATICA® programs are available from the authors upon request.
12 When both [qL ,qH ] are high the individual borrowing  (12c) and the aggregate liquidity (13)
constraints are violated in state [al, qH] in the insider trading case. We therefore compute the
solution imposing Pc = (1-al)K/[al *(1-K)]. When the aggregate liquidity constraint binds in the
partitions consisting of states {[al, qH], [al, qH]}  also, we further impose  Pb = (1-ah)K/[ah (1-
K)].
13 We carried out comparisons analogous to those in Table I for U(C)=log (C), with relative
risk-aversion of unity, and U(C)=-C-4, with relative risk-aversion of five. When  {al, ah} =
{0.4, 0.6}, insider trading improves outsiders' welfare in three cells in the former case and in
four cells in the latter; the insider does not trade in eight and in five cells, respectively.
